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In this article we highlight the anticompetitive nature of antidumping (AD) legislation. 
Antidumping legislation was set up to protect domestic firms from predatory pricing 
by foreign firms. We argue that protecting highly concentrated industries drastically 
reduces competition at home. In cases where the industry consists only of one or two 
firms, import restriction may breed monopolies at the expense of domestic consumers. 
This article looks at cases filed by the agriculture sector, and at the market 
concentration of industries in this sector, to illustrate the above possibility. We study 
the case of fresh tomatoes in detail to further demonstrate the anticompetitive nature of 
AD legislation. We show the effect of AD legislation on imports, as well as the change 
in the Lerner index in the fresh tomato industry.  
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1. Introduction 
ne of the few economic arguments in favor of antidumping (AD) policy is its 
potential to limit predatory pricing by foreign firms.
1 For a firm to engage in 
predatory pricing, it must have market power. If the industry lends itself to market 
power, limiting imports may reduce market competition in the domestic market. At 
their extreme, AD measures can help create monopolies at home by restricting, and at 
times eliminating, import competition. Thus, AD legislation, intended to support free 
and fair trade, if not implemented properly can create an environment that discourages 
competition. We argue that protecting industries reduces competition in the domestic 
market, and in cases where industries consist of only one or two firms, import 
restriction may breed monopolies. In this article we look at the cases filed by the 
agriculture sector, and at the market concentration of industries in this sector, to 
illustrate the above possibility. 
The agriculture sector is often used as the example of perfect competition. It has 
relatively few barriers to entry, little specific technology and, usually, many 
producers. However, even in the agriculture sector there are a number of products 
whose production is concentrated in the hands of a small group of producers, and 
import restriction leads to a significant decline in market competition. For example, 
Maui Pineapple Company Ltd. is the only producer of canned pineapple in the United 
States; in 1994 it filed a petition for an antidumping duty against imports from 
Thailand, the largest exporter to the United States, and has been protected from import 
competition since June 1995.  
Even in the case of a more competitive industry like fresh tomatoes, we observe a 
decline in market competition. The U.S. fresh tomato industry is quite competitive, 
with more than 1,000 producers in the market, but even in this industry AD legislation 
lead to a significant decline in import competition and a rise in the price-cost margin 
as measured by the Lerner index.
2 We argue that if we see anticompetitive effects 
arising from AD policy even in a relatively competitive industry it is likely the 
anticompetitive effect of AD policy is wide-ranging. 
The anticompetitive nature of AD policy has been discussed in earlier literature. 
Both Lipstein (1997) and Tavaras (2001) note that AD legislation, unlike U.S. 
antitrust legislation, does not take consumer welfare into account. This contention was 
echoed in congressional testimony by Jan Paul Acton, Assistant Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office in 1996. He stated, “Antidumping law serves primarily 
to protect U.S. firms from foreign competition, regardless of the impact on U.S. 
consumers and the economy. In contrast, our antitrust laws serve primarily to 
encourage competition and protect individual consumers and the economy from 
harmful pricing practices” (Acton, 1996, 3). Dumler (2001) highlights the role played 
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by the U.S. AD policy in reducing competition in the high-end supercomputers 
market. The following quotation sums up the argument he makes in his article: “[The] 
U.S. Commerce Department operates under rules that virtually guaranteed a hostile 
ruling, with the end result that overseas competitors have been forced out of the U.S. 
supercomputer market in the name of defending competition.” Taylor (2001) 
considers whether AD policy is used as a coordination mechanism between firms; he 
does not find strong evidence in support. Malhotra (2006) highlights the 
anticompetitive nature of antidumping policy by reflecting on the cases filed in the 
chemical industry. Messerlin (1990) considers the link between AD and domestic 
antitrust policy in Europe for the chemical industry and finds that some AD petitioners 
were charged with antitrust violations shortly after getting import protection. Taylor 
(2001) asks whether there is evidence that AD cases, and suspension agreements in 
particular, are used to support international cartels, and finds little empirical support. 
In our article we first consider the agriculture sector and then carry out a detailed case 
study of the fresh tomato industry to further emphasize our point. 
In the next section we briefly discuss the antidumping procedure in the United 
States. Section 3 highlights the costs and benefits of granting protection to domestic 
industries. Section 4 lists cases filed by industries in the agriculture sector. In this 
section we discuss the competitive nature of the product markets whose firms file for 
import relief. We then go on to discuss the fresh tomato industry in more detail in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes the analysis. 
2. Antidumping Procedure  
nder Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, countries can 
impose duties on imports from a particular country or countries to protect 
domestic industries against dumped imports. In the United States, an interested party
3 
can file an antidumping petition with the Import Administration (IA) and the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging that a domestic industry is materially 
injured or threatened with material injury by the dumped imports. The IA determines 
whether and to what extent dumping is occurring, and the ITC determines whether the 
domestic industry is suffering material injury or is threatened with material injury as a 
result of dumped imports. In the case where a petition is accepted by the ITC and the 
IA, an antidumping investigation is initiated by the IA. 
The petitioner must file on behalf of an industry. The IA sends out a questionnaire to 
the nonpetitioning producers of the product to determine the extent of support for the 
petition. In its initial petition, the interested party has to provide a large amount of 
information about the domestic industry and about the foreign firms importing into the 
United States. The foreign firms named in the dumping allegation are also required to 
provide a large amount of information to defend against the allegations, and have to 
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be present at various hearings. If both the IA and the ITC make affirmative findings of 
dumping and injury, an AD duty equivalent to the dumping margin is imposed on 
imports of that product. The duties remain in effect until an interested party calls for 
an administrative review, and the exporter is found to be no longer dumping. 
3. Predatory Pricing 
oreign firms can engage in a form of predatory pricing in which they set very low 
prices in the export market in order to drive domestic producers out of business. 
This ensures unimpeded entry for these foreign firms in the future in these domestic 
markets. It becomes essential to regulate such behaviour, especially in a developing 
country. Surplus production from a foreign country can be dumped into developing 
markets where a new industry is being established. If such dumping is not regulated it 
can hinder the domestic industry’s development. The new industry, without 
established firms, may not survive a price reduction and might collapse altogether.  
The above argument, however, assumes a certain pattern of behaviour for the 
protected domestic firms. It assumes domestic firms would innovate in the absence of 
import competition. Such is not necessarily the case; the positive correlation between 
competition and innovation is widely accepted. In the absence of competition there is 
little incentive to innovate and grow. Thus, an industry that is promised protection 
from international competition has the potential to degrade rather than grow. Another 
assumption inherent in the above argument is that the domestic industry would grow 
enough to gain comparative advantage in the future. However, the industry might not 
be able to compete internationally even in the long run, due to lack of natural 
resources, higher labour costs, or other factors. The industry might just remain in a 
state of permanent infancy. 
Another point against antidumping legislation is the cost incurred by consumers as a 
result of higher prices for the protected good. Chemicals that serve as intermediate 
goods raise the cost of production of the final product. The higher cost, depending on 
the demand and supply elasticities, trickles down to consumers in the form of higher 
prices. Consumer welfare however, does not play any role in the decision to restrict 
imports. 
To be able to study the claim of predatory pricing we should investigate whether the 
foreign firms claimed to be dumping have any market power in the domestic market. 
Most of these data are difficult to obtain at the foreign-firm level. Looking at the 
number of firms in the domestic industry in the importing country should nevertheless 
give us some idea of the average level of market power of domestic as well as foreign 
firms. We specifically consider agricultural products, since for all such products the 
technology is well understood and is usually generally available. Likewise, for many 
of these cases, there are few or no barriers to entry. 
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4. Overview of Antidumping in the Agriculture Sector 
Over the past decade, there has been a substantial upsurge in the number of 
antidumping cases across the world. This increase occurs as more and more countries 
adopt AD legislation. By 1999, 34 countries were reported to have AD laws in place, 
as compared to 9 countries in 1980. Roughly 111 AD cases have been initiated in the 
agriculture sector.
4 Despite an increase in the users of AD legislation, the traditional 
users still account for a majority of these cases. The United States and Canada are the 
largest users, followed by the Latin American countries of Mexico, Brazil and Peru, 
which together accounted for 20 percent of all the cases.
5 It also seems that NAFTA 
members are the key players, accounting for 40 percent of all antidumping cases filed 
between 1995 and 2003.
6  
 
Figure 1 Antidumping Cases Initiated in the Agriculture Sector (1995-2003) 
Sources: World Trade Organization: AD Statistics from Reporting Countries 
 
We now look at antidumping cases filed by the agriculture sector of the biggest user 
of this protectionist tool, the United States.
7 The products we consider fall under three, 
two-digit SIC industries: SIC 01 (agricultural products: cash grains, field crops, 
vegetables and fruits); SIC 02 (livestock and livestock products); and SIC 20 (food 
and kindred products – processed food industry). Table 1 lists the number of 
antidumping petitions filed with the ITC and International Trade Administration 
(ITA) within these two-digit SIC industries. Antidumping data for the period 1995-
2002 come from the WTO web site, and data for the period 1990-1995 come from the 
ITC’s web site. Information about the petitioners and the market structure is gathered 
from reports published by the ITC. 
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Table 1  AD Cases Brought by U.S. Industries, 1990-2002, by two-digit SIC 
SIC SIC  code  Frequency 
Agricultural products: grains and crops   01  8 
Livestock and livestock products   02  7 
Food and kindred products   20  15 
Total    30 
Sources: WTO web site, U.S. ITC preliminary reports
 
SIC 20 encompasses food manufacturing, which is relatively more concentrated than 
the primary agricultural industries. SIC 20 industries have also filed more cases than 
have SIC 01 and 02 industries. One reason for the larger number of cases may be that 
since SIC 20 is relatively more concentrated, the free rider problem associated with 
filing an AD case is reduced. Views are mixed on the significance of concentration 
ratio in the petitioning decision of an industry; some studies find it to be a significant 
factor, where others find it to be insignificant (please see Finger, 1981). Since the 
financial cost of petitioning is quite high, it is logical to think that a firm or group of 
firms would file for import relief if the benefits from such protection outweigh the 
costs; these benefits increase with an increase in the market share for these firms. 
Table 2 reports information about the petitioners. Groups can also file petitions; if 
more than one firm feels the industry is being injured by unfair imports they can file 
the case as co-petitioners. In most cases in the agriculture sector the petitions are filed 
by coalitions or associations.
8 Thus, a few firms can act together to file a case, 
reducing the cost of petitioning facing any individual firm and overcoming the free 
rider issue that might prevent an individual firm from taking action.  
Table 2 gives a breakdown of the number of firms that asked for import restrictions. 
Column three reports the number of firms or establishments in the domestic industry.
9 
Column four (frequency) reports the number of countries named in the investigation. 
Column five reports the number of petitioners that actually filed the dumping 
complaint and asked for an AD duty. For cases where there were more than 20 
coalition members, we simply report that the petition was made by a coalition. As the 
table illustrates, the level of competition varies across industries within the agriculture 
sector. 
 
Table 2  Concentration in the Domestic Industry (AD Petitions, 1990-2002) 
2-digit 
SIC  Product 
No. of firms or 
establishments 




No. of AD 
petitioners 
01  fresh garlic (1994)  16  1  7 
01  fresh cut roses (1994)  250  2  coalition   K. Baylis and N. Malhotra 
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01  fresh tomatoes (1996)  >1000  1  coalition 
01 
durum and hard  
red spring wheat  >1000  1  coalition 
01  fresh kiwifruit (1991)  >1000  1  coalition 
01  spring table grapes  >1000  2  coalition 
02 
fresh Atlantic  
salmon (1997)  12  1  7 
02  honey (1994)  >1000  2  coalition 
02  live cattle (1998)  >1000  2  coalition 
02 
fresh and chilled  
Atlantic salmon (1990)  ?*  ?*  coalition 
20 
canned pineapple  
(1994)  1  1  1 
20  butter cookies in tins (1998)  2  1  1 
20 
live processed  
blue mussels  3  1  1 
20 
tart cherry juice &  
concentrate (1991)  10  2  1 
20 
certain pasta  
(non-egg) (1995)  17  2  3 
20 
non-frozen apple juice  
concentrate (1999)  16  1  5 
20 
preserved mushrooms 
(1998)  10  4  7 
20 
freshwater crawfish  
tail meat (1996)  45  1  coalition 
20 
individually quick frozen  
red raspberries  50  1  coalition 
20  certain frozen fish fillets  ?*  1  coalition 
Source: ITC Preliminary Reports. 
* We could not obtain data for these cases. 
 
As mentioned previously, most of the cases in agriculture were filed by coalitions, 
trade groups or associations. SIC 01 (agricultural products) industries filed eight AD 
petitions in six product groups.
10 The domestic market for all of the products except 
for fresh garlic seems to have a low concentration, with over 1,000 producers or 
growers. Large producer numbers also characterize SIC 02 industries, (livestock and 
livestock products), where four out of the five cases were filed by industries that have 
low market concentration, again with over 1,000 producers. 
Domestic industries belonging to SIC 20 (processed food) that filed for protection 
seem to be highly concentrated, with fewer than 50 producers in all products. In the 
case of canned pineapple, the single firm filing the petition (Maui Pineapple 
Company) is the sole producer of the product. This case ended in an affirmative 
decision, with a 29 percent AD duty on imports, further increasing the market power 
of the domestic firm.    K. Baylis and N. Malhotra 
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The number of petitioners filing AD cases also reflects the market structure. In cases 
where there are more than 1,000 U.S. producers, the cases have been filed by 
coalitions with long lists of members. Where the domestic market has fewer than 20 
producers, we observe a couple of firms filing for protection. In five cases, all in 
processed food industries, the petition was filed by a single firm. Action by a single 
petitioner implies that this one firm had at least 25 percent of the market share. Thus, 
processed food industries filing AD cases were relatively highly concentrated. This 
finding is echoed by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
11 (HHI) for the processed food 
industry, which is 1038, relatively higher than the average HHI for the average 
manufacturing sector, which stands at 785.
12 Thus, even in a market with known 
technology and few barriers to entry, we can see relatively concentrated domestic 
industries asking for AD measures, raising the concern that AD legislation may 
facilitate anticompetitive practices. 
It is not surprising that most cases in SIC 01 and SIC 02 industries are filed by 
numerous firms, as petitioners have to account for at least 25 percent of the market 
share. Given such strong competition in the United States it seems unlikely that 
foreign firms are employing predatory pricing or pose a threat to competition in the 
U.S. market. However, increased protection can change domestic profit. To illustrate 
this effect, we choose a case that was filed by a coalition in an industry with more 
than 1,000 firms: fresh tomatoes. We will show in the next section that even in the 
fresh tomato industry import competition significantly declined, and the Lerner index 
for the domestic industry increased, after restrictions were imposed as a result of the 
AD petition. 
5. Case Study: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico 
n the case of fresh tomatoes, where there is a lot of competition (and common 
technology), we still see an increase in the price-cost margin after the AD duty is 
imposed on imports.
13 The implication is that competitive concerns need to be 
considered when evaluating AD cases.  
On April 1, 1996, various U.S. tomato growers, in an action initiated by farmers 
from Florida, filed an antidumping petition alleging that their industry was threatened 
by fresh tomatoes from Mexico imported “at less than fair value” (USITC, 1996). The 
petition was in response to a sharp rise in tomato imports (276 percent) from 1992 to 
1996, the bulk of which came from Mexico (93 percent in 1996). U.S. production fell 
21 percent over the same period, and U.S. prices dropped from $0.79 per kg. to $0.63 
in 1996. On December 6, 1996, the United States and Mexico reached a “suspension” 
agreement whereby Mexico would voluntarily limit its exports, and in return the 
United States would suspend the antidumping case and remove the antidumping 
tariffs. Mexico agreed to set a single reference (floor) price of $5.17 per 25-lb. carton 
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(or 20.68 cents per lb.) of tomatoes exported to the United States. For the suspension 
agreement to hold, producers representing 85 percent of the exports had to agree to be 
bound by the minimum price. 
Figure 2 highlights the import patterns for fresh tomatoes coming in from Mexico, 
which account for more than 90 percent of the import market. After the suspension 
agreement of 1996, there was a considerable decrease in the level of imports coming 
in from Mexico, which declined by 29.1 percent from 1996 to 2000.  (Total imports of 
fresh tomatoes, that is, imports from all sources, declined by 4.8 percent over the same 
period, from C$672 million in 1996 to C$640 million in 2000.) The import data at the 
eight-digit harmonized system (HS) level for Mexico and other countries were 










































Figure 2  Imports of fresh tomatoes from Mexico, before and after the restriction. 
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Figure 3  Lerner index in the fresh tomato industry, before and after the restriction. 
 
Using regional cost-of-production data from Florida State University and from 
extension officers in Southern California (various years), and farm-gate prices for the 
United States, we calculated the Lerner index for two tomato-growing areas in Florida 
and one in California.
15 As figure 3 shows, the Lerner indexes for Florida dropped in 
the two years before the dispute and (with the exception of a large drop in 1999) have 
been higher since then. We have California data for only three years, but the pattern of 
that Lerner measure is consistent with the Florida series. Thus, even in an industry 
with many producers, AD disputes can affect the price-cost margin. 
6.Conclusion 
he main aim of this article is to highlight the anticompetitive nature of the U.S. 
antidumping legislation. By granting import protection to domestic markets with 
few or single firms, the ITC and IA might be promoting monopolies at the cost of 
consumer welfare. This article raises the following questions: In the face of dumped 
imports, should national governments adopt protectionist strategies? Does such 
protection provide an environment conducive to the growth of domestic industries, or 
does it discourage competition and distort market conditions? These questions need to 
be further researched for a better understanding of this issue.   
Over the past decade there has been a substantial upsurge in the number of 
antidumping cases across the world as more and more countries adopt AD legislation. 
Thirty-four countries were reported to have AD laws in force in 1999, as compared to 
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nine countries in 1980. The traditional users (the United States, the EU, Australia and 
Canada) now account for only 50 percent of AD cases as compared to 99 percent from 
1980 through 1985. The spread of AD legislation among various countries makes it 
even more important to understand the AD mechanism and its threat to international 
competition.  
 
   K. Baylis and N. Malhotra 
 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  49 
References 
Acton, Jan Paul. 1996. CBO testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. April 
23. 
Dumler, M. Christopher. 2000. Antidumping laws trash supercomputer competition. 
Centre for Trade Policy Studies, CATO Institute. 
Finger, J. Michael. 1981. The industry-country incidence of “less than fair value” 
cases in U.S. import trade. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 21: 
260-79. 
Kerr, W. A. 2006. Dumping: trade policy in need of a theoretical make over. 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 54(1): 11–31. 
Lipstein, R. A. 1997. Using antitrust principles to reform antidumping law. In 
Global Competition Policy, eds. E. M. Graham and J. D. Richardson. 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 
Malhotra, Nisha. 2006. Is antidumping legislation a threat to competition? A case 
study of the U.S. chemical industry. Competitiveness Review 16(1): 51–56. 
Messerlin, P. 1990. Antidumping regulations or pro-cartel law? The EC chemical 
cases. World Economy 13: 465-92. 
Tavaras, Jose. 2001. Legal and economic interfaces between antidumping and 
competition policy. www.netamericas.net/Researchpapers/ 
Documents/Tavares/tavares6.doc 
Taylor, Christopher T. 2001. The economic effects of withdrawn antidumping 
investigations: is there evidence of collusive settlements? Federal Trade 
Commission, Bureau of Economics Working Paper 240. Washington, D.C. 
Endnotes 
                                                      
1.   For a good discussion of the possible conflicts between the rationale for 
antidumping measures and economic reasoning see Kerr, 2006. 
2.   The Lerner index is a measure of industry or firm profit and is often used to 
indicate possible market power. The Lerner index is calculated as (price–
marginal cost)/price. 
3.   Interested parties include the following: 1) a manufacturer, producer, or 
wholesaler of the product in the United States; 2) a certified union or group of 
workers that is representative of the industry; 3) a coalition of firms, unions, or 
trade associations that represent the industry. 
4.   This accounts for roughly 6 percent of the overall AD cases filed.  
5.   Mexico began using AD measures in 1987; Peru and Brazil first used AD 
measures in 1994 and 1998, respectively. 
6.   These cases are against both NAFTA members and non-NAFTA members.   K. Baylis and N. Malhotra 
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7.   Since the United States is the biggest user of AD mechanisms in the agriculture 
sector, it provides a good sample for such a study. Also, it allows a good 
reflection of the market power that foreign firms might have. For example if 
there are over 1,000 firms in the domestic market, each with almost negligible 
market power, it is very likely that the foreign firms exporting into the U.S. 
market do not have much market power either. Of course such a claim cannot be 
made if the importing country is a small country.   
8.   In the agriculture sector there were no labour unions as co-petitioners, as there 
were in other industries, for example steel. 
9.   Our use of “domestic industry” is as defined by ITC; it can be defined as 
narrowly as the eight-digit harmonized system (HS) level.  
10.  AD petitions for fresh cut roses were filed against two countries, and these are 
counted as two cases. This method of counting AD petitions is in general use. 
(This method is also used for the WTO data.)  
11.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration. It 





2. The HHI ranges from 0 to 10,000, with 10,000 indicating 
a monopoly. 
12.  Data source: annual survey of manufacturers (figures are averages over 90s 
data). 
13.  Later we show that for the case of fresh tomatoes from Mexico the price-cost 
margin for the domestic industry increased after the AD duties were put in place. 
14.  These data can be downloaded from the FATUS database at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FATUS/ 
15.  The marginal cost data come from estimates from the Florida State University 
and from extension officers in Southern California, reported in the USITC 
annual reports (various years). Price data are from the USDA-ERS Tomato 
Briefing Room Farm Gate Prices (http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-
sets/specialty/92010/). Some of the Lerner indexes are zero or slightly negative 
in 1995, presumably due to a surge in foreign imports, and in 1999 because 
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